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CASENOTE

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR FAILURE
TO TRAIN UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983: THE CONFUSION CONTINUES-City of Springfield, Massachusetts v. Kibbe, 107 S. Ct.
1114 (interim ed. 1987) (per curiam), dismissing cert. as improvidently granted to 777 F.2d 801 (1st Cir. 1985).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The theory of municipal liability for failure to train pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 19831 has been plagued by considerable judicial disagreement' in recent years.3 Most recently, the Supreme Court, in City of
1.

(1982). The section states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory of the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
Section 1983 "creates no substantive rights; it merely provides remedies for deprivations of
rights established elsewhere." City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 144 n.3 (1979)). For
commentary providing a general overview of the § 1983 prima facie case, see generally Mahoney,
The Prima Facie Section 1983 Case, 14 URB. L. 131 (1982); Eagan, The Scope of Supervisory
Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 6 J. CONTEMP. L. 141 (1979); Comment, Municipal Liability
Under Section 1983 for Civil Rights Violations After Monell, 64 IowA L. REv. 1032 (1979). For
a thorough discussion of the general scope, background and analysis of the legislative history of §
1983, see Littlejohn, Civil Liability and the Police Officer: The Need for New Deterrents to Police
Misconduct, 58 U. DET. J. URB. L. 365, 411-19 (1981); Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After
Monell, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 213 (1979) (Mr. Schnapper was an attorney for the petitioners in
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)); Kushnir, The Impact of Section
1983 after Monell on Municipal Policy Formulation and Implementation, 12 URB. L. 466 (1980);
Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1133, 1137-90
(1977); Note, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: The Meaning of "Policy or Custom," 79
COLUM. L. REV. 304, 305, 307-15 (1979).
2. Compare Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (negligent failure to train or
supervise police force is actionable under § 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. District of
Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973) with Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319, 326
(2d Cir. 1986) (deliberate indifference is requisite degree of fault); Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d
812, 820 (lst Cir. 1985) ("supervision must demonstrate at least gross negligence amounting to
deliberate indifference and. . . this conduct must be causally linked to the subordinate's violation
of civil rights"); Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985) (the acceptance of
dangerous recklessness by a city policymaker is sufficient to render a municipality liable); Patzner
v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1367 (8th Cir. 1985) ("deliberate indifference" where training so
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Springfield, Massachusetts v. Kibbe,4 refused to define "the full contours of municipal liability under section 1983"' by failing to decide
the issue of whether a city can be held liable under section 1983 for the
inadequate training or supervision of its employees and the related
question of whether more than simple or heightened negligence in
training or supervision is required to establish such liability." Therefore, questions still exist as to whether the inadequate training of police
officers constitutes a viable theory of municipal liability under section
1983 and, if so, what standard should govern the imposition of
7
liability.
This casenote examines the impact of the Kibbe decision on the
current scope and status of section 1983 actions against governmental
entities. To provide a basis for discussion, the casenote first presents an
overview of the significant Supreme Court decisions interpreting section
1983 in the context of municipal liability. The casenote then analyzes
the narrower issue of inadequate training as actionable conduct in light
of City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle8 and Kibbe. Next discussed are the
disparate lower federal court standards governing the imposition of municipal liability under section 1983. Finally, the casenote evaluates the
Kibbe dissent for its potential in predicting how the Supreme Court
may rule on these issues and for the guidance the dissent may provide
lower courts.

grossly negligent "that police misconduct inevitably occurs"); Languirand v. Hayden, 717 F.2d
220, 227 (5th Cir. 1983) (failure to properly train a police officer must constitute gross negligence
amounting to deliberate indifference), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984); Doe v. New York City
Department of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 143 n.3 (2d Cir. 1981) (simple negligence does not
establish a cause of action under § 1983) and with Sixth Circuit cases Marchese v. Lucas, 758
F.2d 181, 189 (6th Cir. 1985) (county was held liable for injuries resulting from sheriff's official
policy of failure to require appropriate training and discipline of his officers and his ratification of
the use of wanton brutality by members of his force); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 746 F.2d
337 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (municipal liability may be imposed for a single
decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances); Rymer v. Davis, 754 F.2d

198 (6th Cir. 1984) (after Supreme Court vacated appellate court decision and remanded for
consideration, liability was imposed on the basis of inadequate training or supervision amounting
to "deliberate indifference" or "gross negligence" on the part of the city officials); Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir.) (simple negligence is insufficient to support liability of
police officials and municipalities for inadequate training and supervision), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
833 (1982).
3. See, e.g., Comment, City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle: Causation in Municipal Liability
Cases under Section 1983, 11 OKLAHOMA CITY U. L. REV. 207, 215 (1986).

4.
5.
6.
7.

107 S.Ct. 1114 (interim ed. 1987) (per curiam).
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978).
Kibbe, 107 S.Ct. at 1115.
See Comment, supra note 3, at 218-20.

8.

471 U.S. 808 (1985).
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II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Clinton Thurston was shot and killed during a car.chase on September 28, 1981 by Springfield, Massachusetts, Police Officer Theodore
Perry." On that night, the Springfield Police Department received telephone calls reporting that an individual identified as Thurston had broken into an apartment and assaulted a woman staying there."0 When
police officers arrived at the scene, they discovered that the woman had
been abducted by Thurston and driven away in his car." Shortly thereafter, Thurston's fleeing vehicle was spotted by a police officer driving
an unmarked car.1" When Thurston stopped at an intersection, the officer walked up to Thurston's vehicle and identified himself as a police
officer, but Thurston drove away.13 The officer chased him and eventually other officers joined in the pursuit.1 4 While passing a second roadblock obstacle without stopping, Thurston was shot by Officer Perry
and died from the gunshot wound a short time later.'
The administratrix of Thurston's estate filed suit against the City
of Springfield, Massachusetts, and the police officers involved in the
incident in federal district court under section 1983, alleging that the
city and its police officers had deprived Thurston of his civil rights.1 6
After trial, the jury rendered, verdicts against the city and Officer
Perry, but found in favor of the other officers.17 The jury awarded one
dollar in compensatory damages and $500 in punitive damages against
Perry and $50,000 in compensatory damages against the city. 8 The
district court denied the city's motion for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 19 The city appealed the district
court's denial of its motions and also claimed error on the jury
charge,20 arguing that a heightened negligence standard does not satisfy the municipal policy requirement first enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Monell v. Department of Social Services.2 ' The Court of Ap9. Kibbe v. City of Springfield, 777 F.2d 801, 802-03 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed per
curiam as improvidently granted, 107 S. Ct. 1114 (interim ed. 1987).
10. 777 F.2d at 802.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 802-03.
16. Id. at 801. The administratrix of Thurston's estate alleged a policy of inadequate training as the basis for municipal liability. Id. at 808.
17. Id. at 802.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 809.
21. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). At the trial level in Kibbe, the city "did not object to the jury
instruction stating that gross negligence would suffice and indeed proposed its own instruction to
Published by eCommons, 1987
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peals for the First Circuit affirmed. 2
The Supreme Court "granted certiorari to resolve the question
whether[, consistent] with [its] decision in Monell . . a municipality
can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for inadequate training
of its employees."218 However, the Court did not reach this issue nor the
related question of whether more than negligence in training was required in order to establish such liability. Holding that the appellants
had waived their challenge to the jury charge by failing to make a
timely objection to the instructions with the sufficient specificity required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51,24 the Court ordered the
writ dismissed as improvidently granted. 5 In fact, because of this inability to reach the negligence issue, the Court considered this case to
be an "inappropriate vehicle for resolving the inadequate training question. 12 6 It is important to note, however, that the court of appeals
clearly reached and decided the negligence issue, upholding the trial
court's gross negligence jury instruction.2
8
Justice O'Connor, writing for the dissent,2 argued that there were
no prudential reasons nor jurisdictional bars to reaching the negligence
issue. 29 The dissent supported its position by reasoning that the court of
appeals "expressly ruled on the question, in an appropriate exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction" and, therefore, the question was properly
30
before the Supreme Court to be decided on its merits. The dissent
then went on to evaluate whether the failure to train amounting to deliberate indifference or reckless disregard for individual rights consti-

Kibbe, 107
the same effect. Nor did it argue for a higher standard than gross negligence .
S. Ct. at 1115; see also infra note 24.
22. Kibbe v. City of Springfield, 777 F.2d 801, 810 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed per
curiam as improvidently granted, 107 S. Ct. 1114 (interim ed. 1987).
23. Kibbe, 107 S.Ct. at I115.
24. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 requires counsel objecting to a jury instruction to
"stat[e] distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection." FED. R. Civ.
P. 51. Therefore, the Court held that the challenge to the jury charge was not properly preserved
on appeal. Kibbe, 107 S.Ct. at 1115.
25. Kibbe, 107 S.Ct. at 1116 (upon which the Court dismisses).
26. Id.at 1115.
dissenting).
27. See id. at 1118 (O'Connor, J.,
28. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Powell joined in the dissent. See id.
at 1116 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 1119 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In response to the dissent's argument, the majority conceded that:
there is doubtless no jurisdictional bar to our reaching [the issue], whether or not the Court
of Appeals did so. We think, however, that there would be considerable prudential objection to reversing a judgment because of instructions that the petitioner accepted, and indeed itself requested. That the Court of Appeals was fortunate enough to entertain the
issue without reaching that outcome would not justify our running the same risk.
Id. at 1116 (citation omitted).
30. Id.at 1119.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss1/6

1987]

CASENOTE

tuted a viable theory of municipal liability under section 1983. Before

discussing the analysis of fault articulated by the Kibbe dissent, it is
necessary to review fundamental case law outlining the history and development of section 1983.

III.

BACKGROUND

A. Municipal Liability Under Section 1983 Pre-City of Oklahoma
City v. Tuttle 1
An analysis of the legislative history and statutory language of the
Civil Rights Act of 187132 dictates the conclusion that Congress intended section 1983 to provide remedies for citizens of the United
States who have been deprived of constitutionally-protected rights by
governmental action." In Monell v. Department of Social Services,"'

the Supreme Court held that a municipality was a "person" within the
meaning of the statute and subject to liability pursuant to section 1983
when its official policy or its governmental custom 3 5 was responsible for
a deprivation of constitutional rights.36 The Court further concluded
that Congress did not intend for municipalities to be held vicariously
liable for the tortious conduct of their employees 7 and specifically
31. 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
32. ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
33. In re-examining the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 the Supreme
Court in Monell concluded that "Congress did intend municipalities and other local government
units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies." Monell v. Department of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (footnote omitted). The Court added that "[local governing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a
policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that
body's officers." Id. (footnote omitted).
34. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Monell overruled an earlier construction of the Civil Rights Act
that had completely immunized municipalities from suit under § 1983. In Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961), the Supreme Court, while upholding plaintiff's right of action under §
1983 against Chicago police officers for violations of federal constitutional rights, also held that §
1983 was not intended to grant a right of action against local units of government and dismissed
the suit as to the City of Chicago. Indeed, the Court held in Monroe that a city was not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983. Id. at 191, overruled in Monell, 436 U.S. at 695.
35. Monell, 436 U.S. at 658, 690-91. Monell limits what may constitute "custom." The
Court defined custom as "[the] practices of state officials [that are] so permanent and well settled
. . . as to constitute a 'custom of usage' with the force of law." Id. at 691 (quoting Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970) (defining the term "custom" as "persistent and
widespread . . . practices" or practices that are "permanent and well settled") (footnote omitted)); accord Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 472
U.S. 1016 (1985).
36. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95.
37. Id. at 692; see also City of Springfield, Mass. v. Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. 1114, 1119 (interim
ed. 1987) (per curiam) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Monell requirement of "policy" or "custom" was intended to prevent ,"the imposition of municipal liability under circumstances where no
wrong could be ascribed to municipal decisionmakers." Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 817-18 (Rehnquist, J.,
Published
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noted that municipal liability under section 1983 could be imposed only
where the municipality itself "caused" the constitutional violation. 8
In Monell, the scope of municipal liability was further refined
when the Court elaborated on its "affirmative link" requirement set
forth in Rizzo v. Goode 9 and stated that the official policy or custom
must be the "moving force" of the constitutional violation.' 0 Thus, for a
plaintiff to carry the burden of proof in a section 1983 causation inquiry, the fundamental requisites set forth in Monell must be satisfied. 41 Specifically, the plaintiff must: (1) identify an official governmental policy or custom; 4 2 (2) prove the deprivation of a particular
constitutional right;' 3 and (3) show a causal connection between the
"execution of a government's [culpable] policy or custom" and the constitutional injury suffered." In effect, Monell imposes liability on municipalities for "deprivations of constitutional rights visited pursuant to
municipal policy, whether that policy is officially promulgated or authorized by custom.' 5 Consequently, according to Monell, the "touchstone" of a section 1983.action against a municipality is a direct causal
connection between municipal conduct and the constitutional deprivation.' 6 Although the policy or custom standard set forth in Monell

plurality opinion).
38. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. The court in Monell cautioned that a municipality cannot
be held liable pursuant to § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory of liability. That is, a municipality cannot be held vicariously liable regardless of its fault merely because it employed a tortfeasor.
Rather, the municipality itself must be at fault pursuant to some official municipal policy causing
a constitutional tort (deprivation). Id., at 691-92. Thus, the Monell court distinguished between
ordinary tort liability and the liability of governmental units under § 1983. Id.; see also Hinshaw
v. Doffer, 785 F.2d 1260, 1263 (5th Cir. 1986) (§ 1983 does not impose liability on a police chief
under a vicarious liability or respondeat superior theory); Harvey v. Andrist, 754 F.2d 569, 572
(5th Cir. 1985) (there must be a causal connection between the act of the city official and the
Constitutional violation for § 1983 liability); Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756, 768 (5th Cir. 1983)
(sheriff may not be held liable under § 1983 on the basis of vicarious liability); Reimer v. Smith,
663 F.2d 1316, 1323 (5th Cir. 1981) (a supervisory official cannot be sued under a theory of pure
vicarious liability or respondeat superior under § 1983); Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 606 F.
Supp. 928 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (constitutional duty distinguished from a normal tort duty).
39. 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976).
40. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (citing Rizzo. 423 U.S. at 370-71); accord Polk County v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981).
41. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-95; see also Oliver, Municipal Liability for Police Misconduct
Under 42 U.S.C. 1983 After City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 151, 159 (1986);
Note, Bennett v. City of Slidell and Webster v. City of Houston: The Fifth Circuit Establishes
Contours of Municipal Liability Under Section 1983, 37 BAYLOR L. REv. 1069-89, 1071 (1985)
("[c]ity liability can be based on the governing body's director indirect [passive] actions").
42. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
43. Id. at 690-91.
44. Id. at 694-95.
45. Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 737 F.2d 894, 901 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91).
46. Monell, 436 U.S. at 658, 690; see also Oliver, supra note 41, at 163 (citing Polk
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss1/6
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"limit[ed] the circumstances under which a local governmental unit
[could] be held liable for the acts of its employees and agents,"

7

mu-

nicipal liability under section 1983 remained ill-defined and continued
to confuse lawyers and confound the lower federal courts. 8
B. Municipal Liability Under Tuttle: Inadequate Trainingas Actionable Conduct

In 1985, the Supreme Court took a "small but necessary step toward defining [the] contours" of municipal liability in Tuttle. The issue

in Tuttle was specifically limited to whether a single isolated use of
excessive force by a police officer established an official policy or prac-

tice of a municipality sufficient to render the municipality liable for
damages under section 1983.' The Court held that "[piroof of a single
incident of unconstitutional activity [was] not sufficient to impose [municipal] liability [under section 1983], unless . . . the incident . . . was
caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy . .

-.o In-

deed, Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Tuttle, addressing the validity of the plaintiff's inadequate-training theory under the Monell
policy or custom standard,5 1 went on to state that where the municipal

policy relied upon for liability is not itself unconstitutional, "considerably more proof than the single incident will be necessary in every case
County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325-27 (1981)).
47. Note, supra note 41, at 1069.
48. In Tuttle, Justice Rehnquist noted that "[c]ases construing Monell in the courts of
appeals, have served to highlight the full range of questions, and subtle factual distinctions, that
arise in administering the 'policy' or 'custom' standard." Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 820 (Rehnquist, J.,
plurality opinion) (citation omitted). See, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 164-66
(1985); Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016
(1985); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 737 F.2d 894 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Languirand v.
Hayden, 717 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984).
49. 471 U.S. at 814 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion). The Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals' affirmance because the jury instructions permitted the jury to "infer" from "a
single unusually excessive use of force . . . that it was attributable to inadequate training or
supervision amounting to 'deliberate indifference' or 'gross negligence' on the part of the officials
in charge." Id. at 821 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
50. Id. at 823-24 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion). "Causation is divided into two parts for
a section 1983 cause of action. The first part requires proof of an unconstitutional 'policy or custom.' The second part requires that the policy or custom was the 'cause in fact' of the plaintiff's
injury." Comment, supra note 3, at 208 n.12.
51. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823-24 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion). "The Tuttle Court's holding that evidence of a single incident of police misconduct is insufficient to impose municipal
liability is consistent with Monell's interpretation of a section 1983 cause of action against a
municipality. Monell precluded liability when the city was not in some way responsible for the
harm." Comment, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: Rethinking the "Policy or Custom"
Standard After City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 71 IowA L. REv. 1209, 1220-21 (1986) (footnote omitted). Thus, "both cases indicate that section 1983 is unavailable as a remedy against the
city without a showing that the city, as opposed to a nonpolicymaking municipal employee, is in
some way
fault for the 1987
constitutional violation." Id. at 1221 (footnote omitted).
Published
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to establish both the requisite fault on the part of the municipality, and
the causal connection between the 'policy' and the constitutional
deprivation." 5 2
As Justice O'Connor phrased the Tuttle requirements,
to establish municipal liability for a policy that is not itself unconstitutional, the plaintiff must introduce evidence sufficient to establish the existence of the policy; evidence showing that the city was at fault for esthe policy was the
tablishing the policy; and evidence establishing that
53
moving force in causing the constitutional harm.

However, the Court expressly declined to decide whether a policy that
is not itself unconstitutional-such as failure to train-could ever meet
the policy requirements of Monell, and left the mental state requirement unresolved." Thus, the Tuttle opinion left several important
questions unanswered.
C.

Municipal Liability After Tuttle

The Supreme Court, in its most recent post-Tuttle pronouncement
on municipal liability has again declined an opportunity to clarify the
standard governing the imposition of municipal liability for the inadequate training of employees. In City of Springfield, Massachusetts v.

Kibbe,55 the Court was faced with the following issues: (1) whether
"inadequate training of police officers constitute[s] a viable theory of
municipal liability under [section 1983]";5 (2) whether the "single incident rule" set forth in Tuttle is limited in application to one act by
one officer; and (3) whether a "policy of inadequate training [can be
inferred] from [the] conduct of several police officers during [a] single

incident without evidence of prior misconduct, [or] without [a] conscious decision by policy makers, [or] without proof that recognized
52. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 824 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion). Tuttle overruled those decisions adhering to the "single incident rule." Id. at 823-24 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion). See,
e.g., Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1246 (2d Cir.) (proof of a single incident of unconstitutional
activity by police officer could suffice to establish municipal liability), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980
(1979), overruled sub silentio in Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823-24 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
The Supreme Court further refined Tuttle's "single incident rule" in Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986). The majority in Pembaur held that municipal liability may be
imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers "where the decisionmaker possesses final
authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered." Id. at 481. The Court
reasoned that such a decision to follow a particular course of action represents "an act of official
government 'policy.' " Id.
53. City of Springfield, Mass. v. Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. 1114, 1121-22 (interim ed. 1987)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing Tuttle).
54. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 824 n.7 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
55. 107 S. Ct. 1114 (interim ed. 1987) (per curiam).
56. City of Springfield, Mass. v. Kibbe, 55 U.S.L.W. 3048 (June 4, 1985) (No. 85-1217)
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss1/6
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standards of police training were violated." 7 The majority held that
due to a jurisdictional bar these issues were not properly before the
Court and declined to address them.58 Thus, it is not surprising that the
Supreme Court's unwillingness to clarify the standard used to measure
culpability in failure to train cases59 has resulted in disparate lower
court administration of the Monell policy or custom standard. 0 In the
section that follows, the course of these decisions will be discussed.
D. Variations Among the Lower Federal Courts
A review of the lower federal court cases pertaining to municipal
liability under section 1983 reveals a wide divergence of judicial opinion. In addition to the lack of harmony between the circuits, in some
instances there has also been a disparity of decisions within the same
circuit.61 Because of these inconsistencies, it is important to examine
the conflict that exists when a civil rights deprivation allegation is made
pursuant to a municipality's "policy" or "custom." 2 Thus, the following case law analysis outlines the various lower court positions, and in
so doing, will consider the principles announced in decisions of the
courts of appeal.
1. Unconstitutional Custom
In the absence of an explicit policy, some lower federal court cases
allow recovery from a municipality based on an unconstitutional custom said to represent official policy.6" These decisions have established
that a "plaintiff could recover against a municipality for unconstitutional police misconduct if he could prove a pattern and practice of
abuse of which a city had actual or constructive knowledge." ' This
57. id.
58. City of Springfield, Mass. v. Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. at 1114, 1115-16 (interim ed. 1987) (per
curiam).
59. Contemporary police misconduct claims recognize that inadequate training includes
failure to train or failure to supervise. See Comment, supra note 51, at 1209-29, 1212 n.12.
60. See infra notes 63-117 and accompanying text.
61. Note, supra note 41, at 1089; see also cases cited supra notes 2, 48 & infra note 102
and accompanying text.
62. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 658, 694 (1978). "lIlt is when the execution of a government's
policy or custom . . .inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under §
1983." Id.
63. See, e.g., Herrea v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981) (municipality's continuing
failure to remedy known City's informal policy or custom of mistreating Indians is amenable to
suit under § 1983); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 737 F.2d. 894, 904 n.28 (11th Cir. 1984) (en
banc) (no municipal liability was found to exist absent the execution of police department
custom).
64. Oliver, supra note 41, at 161-62 (footnote omitted). Appellate courts in Languirand v.
Hayden, 717 F.2d 220, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984), and WellingPublished
by eCommons,
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line of reasoning was underscored in two recent Fifth Circuit cases,

Bennett v. City of Slidell6 and Webster v. City of Houston."
Bennett raised the issue of whether a municipality could be held
liable for a city employee's isolated acts not shown to be in accordance
with city law, custom, or policy. 67 The Bennett opinion stated that a
city's governing body "may violate [the] rights of people by direct or-

ders" or by setting a course of action for city employees [indirect action] which, when followed by city employees, interferes with some-

one's rights."6 9 In either case, the "course of conduct" must be
attributable to or within city policy or custom. 7 ° Because the court

viewed custom (a pattern of conduct) as one form of policy, 7 1 Bennett
implicitly recognized "custom [as] a separate justification for holding a
city and its officials responsible under section 1983. '
Moreover, the Bennett standard required that, for a municipality
to be charged with liability for actions taken pursuant to a custom,
"[aictual or constructive knowledge of such custom must be attributable to the government body of the municipality or to an official whom

that body had delegated policy-making authority. '73 Accordingly, the
court concluded that there was no legal basis for city liability because:
(1) no policymaking authority was given to either city employee; (2) no

misconduct to impose municipal liability.
65. 728 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016 (1985). Custom is one form
that policy takes and by which it is proven. 728 F.2d at 767. Policy includes the pattern of conduct in actual practice that may be called custom. Id.
66. 735 F.2d 838 (5th Cir.) (en banc), rev'd en banc on other grounds, 739 F.2d 993 (5th
Cir. 1984) (affirmed liability of the city but reversed and remanded as to damages).
67. See Bennett, 728 F.2d at 768 n.3, discussed in Webster, 735 F.2d at 851 n.37. Bennett
involved an isolated instance of wrongful conduct actions taken against the plaintiff-citizen by
high ranking but nonpolicymaking public officials. Bennett, 728 F.2d at 765. The court held that
no municipal policy existed. Id. at 768 n.3, 769-70.
68. Bennett, 728 F.2d at 767; see also Note, supra note 41, at 1069-89, 1075. Direct orders
are those formally promulgated by the city government. See Bennett, 728 F.2d at 767.
69. Bennett, 728 F.2d at 767.
70. Id. at 767. Bennett also recognizes that "when an official has final authority in a matter
involving the selection of goals, his choices represent policy." Id. at 766-67 (citing Bowen v. Watkins, 699 F.2d 979, 989-90 (5th Cir. 1982)).
71. Id. The Bennett court views policy embodied in custom. Id. at 767.
72. Webster, 735 F.2d at 855 (discussing Bennett, 728 F.2d at 767-68) The court considered evidence of actual knowledge to be a showing of "discussions at council meetings or receipt of
written information." Bennett, 728 F.2d at 768. Conversely, the court recognized that "constructive knowledge may be attributed to the governing body on the ground that it would have known
of the violations if it had properly exercised its responsibilities, as, for example, where the violations were so persistent and widespread that they were the subject of prolonged public discussion
or of a high degree of publicity." Id.
73. Webster, 735 F.2d at 841 (citing Bennett, 728 F.2d at 768-69); accord Berry v. McLemore, 670 F.2d 30, 32 (5th Cir. 1982) (single improper arrest not custom). In some cases, however, knowledge of an isolated violation has rendered a city liable under § 1983. See, e.g., Rock v.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss1/6
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evidence existed to prove there was a persistent practice of unequal application of the law; and (3) the city council declared no policy about
the complained of acts.7 4 Thus, it appears that the Bennett holding
adopts the proposition that "isolated violations are not the persistent,
often repeated constant violations that constitute custom and policy." 75
Citing legal principles in accord with Bennett, the plaintiff in Webster alleged that the death of the their son was a violation of section
1983 since it resulted from the Houston police custom of using excessive force.76 According to the standard adopted by the Fifth Circuit to
govern the imposition of municipal liability, a city is liable under section 1983 for deprivations of constitutional or statutory rights "inflicted
pursuant to official policy." 77 The court defined official policy as either:
(1) "A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality's lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policymaking authority," 7'8 or (2) "[a] persistent, widespread practice of city
officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially
adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to
constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy."' 79
The Webster court also recognized that the knowledge of this custom need not be actual. Rather, the existence of constructive knowledge of the policymaker is also sufficient to trigger municipal liability.80
This rationale assumes that for a city to be held liable, an identifiable
"causal connection between some action or inaction by the city and the
asserted constitutional deprivation" is required. 81 Thus, in remanding
the case for consideration under the proper standard, the Webster court
predicted that this decision would turn on "whether the City maintained a practice of allowing the use of excessive police force that was a

74. Bennett, 728 F.2d at 770.
75. Webster, 735 F.2d at 855; Bennett, 728 F.2d at 768 n.3.
76. 735 F.2d at 840. Based on a finding that the district court had improperly excluded
evidence and instructed the jury contrary to the Fifth Circuit's standard governing liability, the
court of appeals vacated and remanded the case "for a new trial under proper evidentiary and
instructional standards." Id. Upon petition for en banc rehearing, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that "the Websters should not be penalized, nor their attorneys, or the trial judge
faulted for the jury instructions that lacked the refinements of our formulation to govern the
imposition of municipal liability .... " Webster v. City of Houston, 739 F.2d 993, 993 (5th Cir.
1984) (en banc). The court of appeals stated that "[flrom the proof made, this jury could have
found liability under the instructions given." Id. Thus the court of appeals affirmed the judgment
as to the liability of the city. Id.
77. Webster, 735 F.2d at 841.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
Published
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'persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is
so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.'"8

In sum, both Bennett and Webster dealt with how policy may be
attributed to a municipality. Essentially, each decision attempted to
clarify the spirit of Monell. Hence, it is important to note that those
federal circuits that follow the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit maintain
that single violations do not constitute custom and policy."
2. Policy and Custom
Some courts that reject the imposition of municipal liability based
upon an isolated violation have adopted a more restrictive application
of Monell by requiring both a policy and a custom as prerequisites to
municipal liability. This standard was adopted by the Fourth Circuit in
Wellington v. Daniels.84 In that case the plaintiff suffered injuries when
he was struck in the head by a policeman wielding a flashlight.85 As a
result of this incident, allegations were made that the city failed to
properly train and supervise police officers in the use of flashlights as
weapons. 86 In Daniels, the existence of city policy had not been articulated, but was alleged to "[stem] from [the police chief's] failure to
prohibit the use of the

. . .

flashlight

. . .

as a weapon.

' 87

Therefore,

the court treated the policy or custom inquiry separately from the causation issue. The court indicated that "[w]hen an official has final authority in a matter involving the selection of goals, his choices represent
policy."8' 8 Thus, the court concluded that municipal liability attaches to
acts or omissions performed pursuant to that policy.8
Specifically, the police chief testified that although he knew the
use of flashlights had caused serious and sometimes fatal injuries, he
did not prohibit their use nor issue cautionary instructions to the police
department regarding the use of a flashlight as a weapon. The court
82. Id. at 842.
83. Id. at 851. Other Circuits that follow this rule are the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh,
and Eleventh. See Craine v. Alexander, 756 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1985); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 737 F.2d 894 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 936 (4th
Cir. 1983); Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1983); Turpin v. Mailer, 619 F.2d 196, 202
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980).
84. 717 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1983); see also Chaudhry v. Prince George's County, 626 F.
Supp. 448, 453 (D. Md. 1985) ("a plaintiff must establish both a municipal policy or custom and
a causal link between such policy or custom and the alleged constitutional injury").
85. Wellington, 717 F.2d at 934.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 936-37.
88. Id. at 936 (citation omitted).
89. Id. at 936.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss1/6
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held there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that a city policy allowing use of a dangerous instrumentality existed, or that the police chief had encouraged any such use.90 The court, in rejecting the
finding of a policy, required a pattern of similar incidents be shown
before a policy could be established. 1
3. Gross Negligence or Deliberate Indifference
Other circuits require gross negligence or deliberate indifference9"
as the standard for defining the degree of municipal culpability required under Monell.'8 However, it is noteworthy that these courts lack
consistency in their treatment of key issues.' 4 Specifically, "[tiheir decisions conflict regarding what constitutes official policy or custom for
purposes of proving inadequate training for which a city may be liable,
and whether or not one may recover on the basis of such training for a
single incident of misconduct.""

90. Id. at 937.
91. Id. at 936.
92. See, e.g., Garcia v. Salt Lake County, 768 F.2d 303, 308-09 n.4 (10th Cir. 1985)
(county was held liable pursuant to § 1983 based upon "evidence of gross deficiencies and deliberate indifferences in staffing and procedures to monitor persons admitted to the jail in an unconscious condition who are suspected of being intoxicated"); Doe v. New York City Department of
Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 141, 145 (2nd Cir. 1981) (defendants may be held liable under §
1983 for a pattern of omissions if an agency's top supervisory personnel exhibited deliberate indifference to plaintiff's welfare); Popow v. City of Margate, 476 F. Supp. 1237, 1244 (D.N.J. 1979)
(culpability pursuant to § 1983 must exceed simple negligence and amount to gross negligence or
recklessness). But see Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 737 F.2d 894 (1984) (en banc) (gross negligence or deliberate indifference is not the proper test for a § 1983 claim against a municipality).
93. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91.
94. See Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 920 (lst Cir. 1985) ("supervisor must demonstrate
at least gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference[,J and [that] conduct must be causally linked to the subordinate's violation of the plaintiff's civil rights"); Rock v. McCoy, 763 F.2d
394, 397 n.l (10th Cir. 1985) (" 'gross negligence' ... is generally held to be the standard necessary to hold a City liable under § 1983 for negligent training of its police force"); Languirand v.
Hayden, 717 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (failure to train must constitute gross negligence amounting to conscious indifference; a plaintiff must show a pattern of prior similar police misconduct
because a single incident is not enough to establish municipal liability), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1215 (1984); Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874, 886 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Only where there is a
pattern of constitutionally offensive acts with failure to invoke remedial measures will there result
in municipal liability for subsequent violations 'if the supervisor's inaction amounts to deliberate
indifference or tacit authorization of the offensive acts.' ") (quoting Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d
196, 201 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980)); Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869,
874 (6th Cir.) ("a supervisory official or a municipality may be held liable only where there is
essentially a complete failure to train the police force, or training that is so reckless or grossly
negligent that future police misconduct is almost inevitable"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 833 (1982);
Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220, 1224 (8th Cir. 1981) (same); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242
(2d Cir.) (a failure to supervise or the lack of a proper training program may be sufficient to
impose municipal liability if it is so severe as to reach the level of gross negligence or deliberate
indifference), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979), overruled sub silentio in Tuttle, 471 U.S. at
823-24 (Rehnquist, J.,plurality opinion).
95. Oliver, supra note 41, at 165.
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a. The Existence of Policy or Custom
In Languirand v. Hayden," for example, allegations were made
that the city had a policy of inadequately training police in the use of
firearms. The plaintiff claimed that a policeman was grossly negligent
and used excessive force when he shot at plaintiff's car in an attempt to
force it to stop.97 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
a municipality was not liable pursuant to section 1983 for the negligence or gross negligence of its subordinate officials in the absence of:
(1) gross negligence by the city in failing to train its police force;" (2)
a city policy or custom of sending under-trained officers on patrol; or
(3) a pattern of similar incidents of misconduct. 99 Concluding that
there was no evidence to establish that the city had any "policy or custom of placing armed officers on the streets who lacked adequate training, skill and experience in the use of firearms," 100 the court determined that the plaintiff lacked the requisite showing to authorize
imposition of municipal liability pursuant to section 1983.11
b.

Omissions v. Acts

Other courts have recognized that an official policy may be inferred from a municipality's omissions as well as from its acts. For example, a federal appellate court in Turpin v. Mailet'0 2 posited this expansive interpretation of Monell, and set forth the proposition that
supervisory inaction can give rise to municipal liability. 0 3 The Board of
Police Commissioner's alleged failure to discipline a police officer
formed the cause of action in Turpin.os The issue raised in that Second Circuit case was whether the municipal inaction constituted an
"official policy" within the meaning of Monell and whether that policy
caused the deprivation of constitutional rights. 0 5 The court rejected the
appellant's contention that an official policy "cannot be inferred from
the omissions of a municipality's supervisory officials"' 06 and held that
if the city "impliedly or tacitly authorized, approved or encouraged

96. 717 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984).
97. 717 F.2d at 222.
98. Id. at 227 (holding that a municipality is not liable under § 1983 for the failure to train
a police officer unless such failure constitutes gross negligence amounting to conscious
indifference).
99. Id. at 230.
100. Id. at 228.
101. Id. at 230.
102. 619 F.2d 196 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980).
103. 619 F.2d at 201.
104. Id. at 197.
105. Id. at 199.
106. Id. at 201.
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harassment, .

.

. it promulgated an official policy within the meaning

of Monell."'1 7 However, the court cautioned that absent a pattern of
illegal conduct, such a policy cannot be inferred from a single incident
of illegality. 10 8 In sum, the court adheres to the standard that such supervisory inaction could give rise to municipal liability only where the
supervisor was deliberately indifferent or tacitly authorized police misconduct.10 9 Thus, an extremely high degree of culpability was required
to impose liability.
c. Single Incident v. Pattern of Misconduct
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found municipal liability despite evidence that showed only a single instance of misconduct
in Owens v. Haas."0 In that case, the court decided that a municipality
could be held liable under section 1983 if the failure to supervise or
properly train law enforcement officials was tantamount to gross negligence or deliberate indifference to the deprivation of the plaintiff's
rights."' The court opined that "[w]hile some causal link must be
made between the county's failure to train and the violation of constitutional rights, a single brutal incident

. . .

may be sufficient to suggest

2
that link."11
The Tenth Circuit apparently followed this reasoning in Rock v.
McCoy." 8 In Rock, the court determined that there existed, in the absence of a city custom encouraging police officers to use excessive force,
certain "circumstances" 4 whereby an isolated incident of police misconduct [rendered the] city liable"" 5 under section 1983. The court
imposed liability on the theory that the city was "grossly negligent in
failing to train the officers, with the foreseeable result that beatings like
those inflicted on [the plaintiff] would occur.""' 6 Moreover, the court
concluded that the city's failure to treat the plaintiff's injuries met the

107. Id.
108. Id. at 202.
109. Id. at 201.
110. 601 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979), overruled sub silentio in
Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823-24 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion). It should be noted that the Supreme
Court in Tuttle has implicitly overruled cases such as Owens and Leite v. City of Providence, 463
F. Supp. 585 (D.R.I. 1978), overruled sub silentio in Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823-24 (Rehnquist, J.,
plurality opinion) which would impose municipal liability on no more evidence than a single incident of misconduct. See also Comment, supra note 3, at 220-21.
I11. Owens, 601 F.2d at 1246.
112. Id. at 1246. The "brutal incident" referred to in Owens was the severe beating of a
prisoner by approximately seven guards. See id. at 1245.
113. 763 F.2d 394 (10th.Cir. 1985).
114. Id. at 398.
115. Id.
116.byId.
at 397.
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deliberate indifference standard.1 17
In sum, the responses of the circuit courts reveal an inconsistent
approach to imposing section 1983 liability on municipalities for the
failure to train. The following analysis focuses on the dissent's position
in Kibbe for its value in identifying the conduct and standard required
to establish municipal liability under section 1983.

IV.

ANALYSIS

A. Inadequate Training as Actionable Conduct: The City of Springfield, Massachusetts v. Kibbe"1 8 Dissent
The Kibbe dissent tackles the issues that the four-member plurality of the Supreme Court was unwilling to consider in City of
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle." 9 That is, in determining section 1983's
standard of causation, the dissent directly addressed whether a policy
of failure to train will ever be actionable and, if so, what standard will
govern in such actions. 20 The dissent's analysis relied primarily upon
the Court's repeated emphasis on the need to find a direct causal connection 2 ' between municipal conduct and the constitutional deprivation because it is important, under section 1983, to distinguish between
direct and vicarious liability.'
Moreover, the dissent concurs with the Tuttle proposition 123 that
the municipal policy must be the "moving force" behind the constitutional deprivation. 4 The Kibbe dissent points out, however, that this

117.

Id.
118. 107 S. Ct. 1114 (interim ed. 1987).
119. 471 U.S. 808, 824 n.7 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
120. Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. at 1121 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 1120 (quoting Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 824-25 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion)); see
also Williams v. City of Chicago, 658 F. Supp. 147, 152 (N.D. Ill. 1987) ("A single act of
misconduct by a lower-level municipal employee is not municipal policy.") (citing Tuttle, 471
U.S. at 821 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion)).
However, "a single act by a high-level officer can be municipal policy for which the municipality is liable under § 1983, if that officer is placed highly enough to be an authorized decisionmaker .
I..."
Id. (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-86 (1986)); see
also Porter v. City of Detroit, 639 F. Supp. 589, 592 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (same).
122. There must be an "affirmative link" between the policy and the constitutional violation. Tuttle. 471 U.S. at 823 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion). It is important to distinguish
between direct and vicarious liability because the personal decisions of a city employee cannot be
ascribed to municipal decisionmakers. Hence, municipal liability cannot be imposed merely on the
basis that a city employed a tortfeasor. This crucial distinction serves to protect municipalities
from frivolous litigation by limiting the scope of actionable conduct to instances whereby an employee acting under "color of some official policy [or custom causes] the violation of another's
constitutional rights." Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978).
123. Tuttle, 808 U.S. at 820 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion) (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981)).
124. Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. at 1120 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol13/iss1/6
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causal link between the municipal policy and the constitutional violation is not always readily apparent.12 5 Thus, the dissent cautioned that
"finding section 1983's causal requirement satisfied by too remote a
connection would 'eviscerate Monell's distinction' between vicarious li-

ability and a municipality's own constitutional violations."' 2 , In Kibbe,
for example, the necessary causal connection was an inherently tenuous
one because a number of factors other than the alleged inadequatelytaught methods used in the city's police training program "were
equally likely to contribute or play a predominant part in bringing

about the constitutional injury."' 1 7
In the main, the dissent in Kibbe recognized grossly inadequate
training as a basis for imposing municipal liability notwithstanding the
reservations expressed in Tuttle.'

However, because of the remote

causal connection between omissions in a police training program and
affirmative misconduct by individual officers in a particular instance,
Justice O'Connor stressed that "the 'inadequacy' of police training may

serve as the basis for [section] 1983 liability only where the failure to
train amounts to a reckless disregard for or deliberate indifference to
the rights of persons within the city's domain."19 This rationale con-

templates that the omissions in a municipal training program constitute
the "moving force" in bringing about the officer's unconstitutional conduct. 3 0 Hence, the dissent considered "negligence in training alone not

sufficient to satisfy the causation requirement of [section] 1983.'' Ac125. When the causal link between the municipal policy and the constitutional deprivation
is readily apparent no "evidence is needed other than a statement of the policy by the municipal
corporation, and its exercise." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 822-23
(Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion)).
126. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
127. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The factors in operation at the time of the officers'
alleged misconduct that serve as intervening causes are: "the disposition of the individual officers,
the extent of their experience with similar incidents, the actions of the other officers involved, and
so forth." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 1119 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see Tuttle, 471 U. S. at 824 nn.7-8 (Rehnquist,
J., plurality opinion).
129. Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. at 1121 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Similarly, a jury should be
permitted to find that the municipality's inadequate training 'caused' the plaintiff's injury only if
the inadequacy of the training amounts to deliberate indifference or reckless disregard for the
consequences.").
130. Id. at 1120 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 1121 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "A number of lower courts have recognized the
need to show more than negligence before a deficient training policy can form the basis for municipal liability under Section 1983 .
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Fiacco v. City of
Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319, 326 (2d Cir. 1986) (deliberate indifference); Languirand v. Hayden,
717 F.2d 220, 227 (5th Cir. 1983) (so grossly negligent as to constitute "deliberate indifference"),
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984); Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1367 (8th Cir. 1985)
("deliberate indifference" where training so grossly negligent "that police misconduct inevitably
occurs"). Other courts have considered the requisite degree of fault to be negligence. See, e.g.,
Published
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cordingly, the dissent further concluded that the appellate court deci-

sion should be reversed because its analysis of "fault" relied upon the
"kind of inferences specifically rejected in Tuttle.' 3 2 Simply stated,
the court of appeals drew inferences that violated Tuttle's command

that "considerably more proof than the single incident will be necessary
in every case to establish . . . the requisite fault on the part of the

municipality."'
B.

33

The Kibbe Dissent: Impact on Tuttle

The gross negligence or deliberate indifference standard articulated by the dissent in Kibbe answers the degree of fault question left
open by the Court in Tuttle.' 31 Adopting this standard would allow

inadequate training to serve as a basis for section 1983 liability where
the failure to train amounts to gross negligence or deliberate indifference. In essence, the dissent seems to suggest that inadequate training

amounting to gross negligence or deliberate indifference implies the existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom as contemplated by the
Court in Monell v. Department of Social Services.'3 5 This compels the

conclusion that inadequate training may be enough to establish municipal liability for a policy that is not itself unconstitutional. 6
It is of particular interest that the Kibbe dissent agrees with the
Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (negligent failure to train or supervise police
force is actionable under § 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter,
409 U.S. 418 (1973).
132. Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. at 1122 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 824
(Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion)). "There was no evidence in the record, apart from the speculative inferences suggested by the Court of Appeals, from which jurors reasonably could conclude
that the City's training in the apprehension of fleeing vehicles manifested recklessness or deliberate indifference." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "Respondent therefore failed to prove an essential element of her claim, and a directed verdict should have been entered in favor of the City."
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
133. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 824 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
134. Id. at 824 n.7 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
135. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. at 1121-22 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(citing principles in accord with Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-95); see also Kibbe v. City of Springfield, 777 F.2d 801, 806 n.4, 810 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed per curiam as improvidently
granted. 107 S. Ct. 1114 (interim ed. 1987).
136. A city may have a written policy representing the municipality's formally adopted
course of action that is itself unconstitutional and injurious. However, in the absence of an explicit
unconstitutional policy, a municipality may be held liable for a constitutional injury caused by the
inadequacy of police training because "the scope and conduct of officer training is traceable to
policymakers, [and] constitutes a municipal policy." Williams v. City of Chicago, 658 F. Supp.
147, 156 (N.D. III. 1987); see also Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 162, 768 n.3 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016 (1985) (citing Leite v. City of Providence, 463 F. Supp. 585,
590 (D.R.l. 1978)).
For an excellent and thorough discussion of the affirmative act/inadequate training distinction, see Oliver, supra note 41, at 153 ("inadequate training should be viewed as 'policy' and thus
it is unnecessary to establish a pattern of violations as with 'custom' ").
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Tuttle majority that more than a single incident is necessary to establish municipal liability pursuant to 1983. " 7 However, this does not
mean that the plaintiff is barred from bringing a section 1983 claim
against a municipality where there has been only a single instance of
allegedly unconstitutional conduct. Rather, "[t]he number of acts or
incidents becomes relevant only as the connection between a municipal
policymaker and the conduct which caused the injury becomes more
tenuous."'3 8 In that instance, the Kibbe dissent requires that there be
evidence apart from speculative inferences from which jurors could
reasonably conclude that a city's training program manifested recklessness or deliberate indifference. "' Essentially, when failure to train
plays a substantial part in bringing about a constitutional violation,
such failure constitutes the causal link." 0 That is, a showing of a policymaker's inaction can satisfy the Tuttle causation standard that there
"be an affirmative link between the policy and the particular constitutional violation alleged.""' In conclusion, the propositions set forth in
the the Kibbe dissent seem entirely consistent with the principles of
municipal liability derived from Tuttle and its progeny.
C.

The Kibbe Dissent: Inadequate Training as Actionable Conduct

It is well settled law that "liability of supervisory personnel must
be based on more than merely the right to control employees."" 2 However, whether an allegation of simple negligence is sufficient to support
municipal liability under section 1983 for failure to train"' "is more
elusive than it appears at first blush.""' What, then, should be the
exclusive standard of liability for municipalities under section 1983?
137. Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. at 1122 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
138. Williams v. City of Chicago, 658 F. Supp. 147, 152 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (citation omitted). When the injury does not stem directly from a formal policy or the acts of a policymaker,
recurring similar incidents may permit an inference that responsible authorities have encouraged
or approved such conduct, or at least they knew or should have known of such conduct and were
deliberately indifferent to it. Id. (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 466-67 (1985)).
139. Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. at 1122 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 1120 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
141. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., plurality
opinion). "[Jiust as a municipality may be liable for the acts of its decisionmakers which deprive
persons of their constitutional rights, so it may be liable when its decisionmakers fail to act or fail
to make a policy and that inaction leads to a deprivation." Williams, 658 F. Supp. at 153.
142. Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 872 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 833
(1982). Such a theory would permit liability to be imposed on a respondeat superior basis alonea basis rejected by the Court in Monell.
143. While the issue of a negligent omission-such as a failure to train-is yet undecided,
the Supreme Court has held that a negligent act is insufficient to constitute a violation of the due
process clause. Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 663 (interim ed. 1986) (overruling Paratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)).
144. Hays, 668 F.2d
872 (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979)).
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That is, what is the requisite state of mind necessary to impose liability
for the failure of a municipality to train or supervise their employees?
While the Kibbe majority avoided answering this question, the dissent in its analysis would offer lower courts some direction. In fact, the
dissent seemed to concentrate on the standard of care and not the failure to train per se. In her argument, Justice O'Connor asserted that
there must be sufficient evidence to support a finding that "the City's
training policy was conducted with reckless disregard for the consequences or deliberate indifference to its citizens' constitutional
rights.""' Justice O'Connor added that such a showing is necessary to
make out a claim that the city caused a deprivation of an individual's
constitutional rights under section 1983.141 Indeed, it becomes apparent
that a state of mind greater than mere negligence is appropriate to
impose municipal liability when a "policy" of inaction is alleged. 47
Moreover, the dissent would seem to suggest that failure to train is
synonymous with being grossly negligent. 4" The dissent indicated that
the "inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for [section]
1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to a reckless disregard for or deliberate indifference to the rights of persons within the
city's domain." ' 19 Thus, although claims based on policymaker inaction
would exist, they would tend to be significantly more difficult to prove.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's dismissal of certiorari in City of Springfield,
Massachusetts v. Kibbe' 5 0 illustrates the Court's continued reluctance
to define the standard that should govern the imposition of municipal
liability pursuant to section 1983. This judicial inaction has promoted
disparate decisions among the lower courts, thereby defeating the uniform application of section 1983. Despite the Court's inability to articulate a definite standard, the dissent, speaking through Justice
O'Connor, recognized the need to show more than mere negligence
before a training policy can form the basis for municipal liability under
section 1983.151 Indeed, the dissent's position is significant because it
proposes a reckless disregard or deliberate indifference standard for the
requisite degree of fault required to establish municipal liability. 5 2

145. Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. at 1121 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
146. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
147. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
148. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
149. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
150. 107 S. Ct. 1114 (interim ed. 1987).
151. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussed supra note 129).
152. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Mere negligence would not be enough. Thus, the dissent's standard
would demand a high degree of defendant culpability before allowing
liability imposition due to omissions in a training program. Given this
result, the dissent should and probably will become the Court's exclusive standard of liability for municipalities under section 1983.
Elissa D. Cohen
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